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THE RIGHT TO STRIKE BY PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
GERALDINE R. KEYES*

In the past, all strikes in the public service have been held
to be against the public interest and, therefore, illegal per se.
Recent years have seen an extension of the definition of public
interest so as to include many groups of employees of private
industry. With this extension of the term public interest to employees in private industry, there should be a concomitant withdrawal of the application of this term to employees of a governmental jurisdiction whose work no more affects the public interest than like groups in private industry.
Labor has been a potent factor in the national socio-economic
picture for the past twenty-five years. Statutory law and judicial
decisions have defined the rights and privileges of employees in
private industry ensuring them of the right to organize, bargain
collectively and strike. Labor relations in the public service have
been neglected chiefly because the government has taken the
position that it is sovereign and has specifically excluded public
employees from the scope of legislative provisions. Public employees have become increasingly aware of the fact that individual action is ineffective in improving the economic and working
conditions of the various levels of government, and this end can
be achieved best through organized group effort.
ORGANIZATION IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE

Federal employees were successful in obtaining the right to
organize through passage of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act in 1912 1
which provides:
That membership in any society, association, club or
other form of organization of postal employees not affiliated with any outside organization imposing an obligation or duty upon them to engage in any strike, or proposing to assist them in any strike, against the United
States, having for its objects, among other things, improvements in the condition of labor of its members, including hours of labor and compensation therefore and
leave of absence, by any person or groups of persons in
said postal service, or the presenting by any such person
or group of persons of any grievance or grievances to the
Congress or any member thereof shall not constitute or
be cause for reduction in rank or compesation or removal
of such person or groups of persons from said service.
The right of persons employed in the civil service of the
United States, either individually or collectively, to petition Congress, or any member thereof, or to furnish
* Written while a student of the University of Denver College of Law.
1 37 Stat. 555, 5 U. S. C. 652.
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information to either House of Congress, or to any committee or member thereof, shall not be denied or interfered with.
Although the Act relates specifically to postal works, it has been
interpreted to give all federal workers the right to organize within
limits without fear of executive reprisal. The first federal agency
to enter into formal agreement with a union representing its staff
was the Post Office Department.2 The initial agreements dealt
with seniority, promotions and hours of labor. Today other federal agencies engage in some degree of collective bargaining with
their employees. The Securities and Exchange Commission, National Labor Relations Board, United States Housing Authority,
Inland Waterways Corporation, Tennessee Valley Authority,
Bonneville Power Administration and the Alaska Railroad all
engage in some form of collective bargaining.
As a general rule, unless prohibited by statute, most states
and their municipalities permit their employees to form employee
organizations. Virginia permits its employees to organize but
not with labor unions who have for a purpose the discussion of
conditions of employment or who claim the right to strike. It is
contrary to the public policy of Virginia to recognize or bargain
collectively with a union.3
New Jersey has also declared by
statute that public employees may organize. By resolution of its
board, the city of Lancing forbids its policemen to organize. Alabama law states that it is contrary to its public policy for employees to organize, because the right to organize carries with it
the right to strike. 4 The city of Dallas passed an ordinance in
December, 1942, which flatly forbids city employees to form any
kind of labor organization. It declares:
It shall be unlawful for any officer, agent or employee,
or any group of them, of the city of Dallas, to orgauiize a
labor union, organization or club of city employees or to
be or become a member thereof, whether such labor
union, organization or club is affiliated or not with any
local, state, national or international body or organization whose character, by-laws or rules govern or control
its members in the matter of working time, working contions or compensation to be asked or demanded of the
city of Dallas.5
The constitutionality of this ordinance as a reasonable and proper
regulation was upheld in Congress of Industrial Organization v.
Dallas.!
The city of Bridgeport, Connecticut passed an ordinance in
1946 which stated that it was the public policy of the city to permit
' Spero, Sterling D., GOVERNMENT AS EMPLOYER, p. 361 passim.
Virginia, Senate Joint Resolution, No. 12, February 8, 1946.
H. J. Resolution No. 142, July 10, 1940.
Spero, Sterling D., GOVERNMENT AS EMPLOYER, pp. 30, 31.
198 S. W. (2d) 143 (Tex. App., 1946).

4Alabama,
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city employees to organize. A recent Connecticut case permitted
-a voluntary public school teachers' association not only to organize
: but also to bargain collectively for the pay and working conditions
!which it might be in the power of the Board of Education to grant.'Another recent court decision reaffirmed the right of public employees to form employee unions and to engage in activities therein even though they may be prohibited from striking." One of the
strongest statements made by a court with regard to the right to
organize was in a Missouri case, City of Springfield v. Clause:"
All citizens have the right, preserved by the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Sections 8 and 9 of Article I of the 1945 Missouri Constitution, Sections 14 and 29, Art. 2, Constitution of 1875, to
peaceably assemble and organize for any proper purpose,
to speak freely and to present their views and desires to
any public officer or legislative body . . . Organization by
citizens is a method of the democratic way of life and
most helpful to the proper functioning of our representative form of government. It should be safeguarded and
encouraged as a means for citizens to discuss their problems together and to bring them to the attention of public
officers and legislative bodies. Organizations are likewise helpful to bring public officers and employees together to survey their work and suggest improvements in
the public service as well as in their own working conditions . . . Organizations of other state, county, and
municipal officers are well known and have long been
recognized as serving a useful purpose ...
The above quotation is typical of the general attitude towards
employee organizations. The denial of the right to organize has
been limited almost entirely to organizations of policemen, firemen and teachers. 0
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE

Any discussion of collective bargaining is usually prefaced
with the statement made by President Roosevelt, a firm believer
in the labor movement, to the effect that:
The process of collective bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted into the public service.
It has its distinct and insurmountable limitations when
Norwalk Teacher's Ass'n v. Board of Education of City of Norwalk, 138
Conn. 269, 83 A. (2d) 482 (1953).
'Broadwater v. Otto, 370 Pa. 311, 88 A. (2d) 878 (1953).
'356 Mo. 1239, 206 S. W. (2d) 539 (1947).
"Police: Fraternal Order of Police v. Harris, 306 Mich. 68, 10 N. W. (2d)
310 (1943) ; City of Jackson v. McLeod, 199 Miss. 508, 24 So. (2d) 319 (1946) ;
Firemen: Carter v. Thompson, 164 Va. 312, 180 S. E. 410 (1935) ; McNatt v.
Lawther, 223 S. W. 503 (1920); Teachers: Fursman v. Chicago, 278 Ill. 318,
116 N. E. 158 (1917); Seattle Chapter of A. F. of L. v. Sharpless, 159 Wash.
424, 293 P. 994 (1930).
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applied to public personnel management. The very nature and purposes of Government make it impossible for
administrative officials to represent fully or to bind the
employer in mutual discussions with Government employee organizations. The employer is the whole people
who speak by means of laws enacted by their representative in Congress. Accordingly administrative officials
and employees alike are governed and guided, and in
many cases restricted, by laws which establish policies,
procedures or rules in personnel matters. Particularly,
I want to emphasize my conviction that militant tactics
have no place in the functions of any organization of
Government employees."
The collective bargaining agreements in the Federal agencies have
never been challenged. The problem arises in municipalities which
have limited jurisdiction depending on delegation of authority
from state constitutions, statutes or city charters. Provisions of
a city charter, so far as they deal with hours, wages, and working conditions of city employees, preclude collective bargaining
with respect thereto. 12 Many public bodies, including the cities of
Chicago, Illinois and Denver, Colorado have dealt with the problem in an effective manner by adopting the policy of paying the
prevailing wage that similar work pays in the community in
private employment. The respective city councils have approved
such wage scales when evidence is presented to them that justifies
the requested wage adjustments.
Other cities have a somewhat hybrid type of collective bargaining. Such collective bargaining agreements are incorporated
in ordinances or resolutions. A Florida court recently upheld the
action of a city which had refused to bargain with its employees
in the water works on the theory that the city charter did not
impose a duty on it to bargain. 1 3 After a similar decision by an
Ohio court 14 holding that the city of Cleveland had no power
either through the state contitution or its city charter to contract
with a union representing motor coach employees, the legislature
passed a law permitting collective bargaining agreements in public
utilities taken over from private ownership where previous collective bargaining agreements were in force. 15 The closed or
union shop contract has been rejected as being a denial of equality
of opportunity of employment, improper discrimination between
classes 16of people and to be restrictive of competition on public

works.

"Letter to Mr. Luther Seward, President of the National Federation of
Federal Employees, August 16, 1937.
1Mugford v. Mayor of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A. (2d) 745 (1945).
::Miami Local No. 654 v. Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. (2d) 194 (1946).
"City of Cleveland v. Division 268 Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric and Motor Coach Employees, 30 Ohio Op. 395 (1945).
"Ohio Laws, 1945, Sec. 258, July 18, 1945.
" Fiske v. The People, 188 Ill. 206, 58 N. E. 985; Adams v. Brenan, 177 Ill.
194, 52 N. E. 314.
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The author of a recent book on labor problems in government"
criticizes the present method of negotiation because decisions
must be made by administrative officials making it necessary for
courts to set and define the area of negotiation. Without statutory
law to guide them, the courts must look to other statutory law
and to case law of dubious relevance in deciding such matters as
legality of union recognition and affiliation, the closed shop, majority representation, the check off, and other issues relating to collective bargaining in public employment. Godine suggests as a
solution to the collective bargaining problem explicit statutory
prescription of the permissible area of group consultation and of
the criteria to be observed in the making of vital decisions affecting conditions of employment. There should be expressed or
implied legislative approval of important administrative revisions
in the terms of public employment. Maintenance of the open shop
and unrestricted eligibility to union membership should be maintained unless a denial were clearly warranted on such grounds as
dishonesty or a betrayal of associational confidences.18
RIGHT TO STRIKE IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE

A thorough study of all strikes against the government was
made in 1940. Of the 1,116 strikes studied, the author comments
that "the calling of a strike, regardless of its duration means the
existence of a labor problem, the exhaustion of pleas and patience,
and the accumulation of resentment to the breaking point ... government strikes are normal results of existing maladjustments in
public employment."1 9 Ziskind analyzed that the failure of wages
to rise with the cost of living was the major reason for strikes
coupled with the fact that the usual budget set wages one year in
advance. Those governmental jurisdictions that set wages equal
with the prevailing wages in the community did not have to cope
with the strike problem. Another major cause was the refusal
of officials to permit organization of government workers. A third
important cause was conflict regarding collective bargaining. 'The
unit of government would feel that to bargain was incompatible
with the authoritarian role of government. Other minor causes
involving working hours, affiliation with the general labor movement, discrimination and fringe benefits.
Government workers have been slow to organize and reluctant to strike. Most of the strikes have been promulgated by those
workers in the craft and industrial field who are more closely
aligned with the national trade unions. It is actually remarkable
Godine, Morton Robert,

1' Ibid, p. 283.

THE LABOR PROBLEM IN THE

PUiBLIC

SERVICE,

p. 92.

1' Ziskind, David, ONE THOUSAND STRIKES OF GOVERNMENT EmPLOYEES, Breakdown of strikes; Public legislation and administration 3, public protection 66,
public education 23, public health and sanitation 94, public road construction
72, public parks and recreation 18, public property maintenance 62, publicly
owned utilities 114, public employment projects 664. Many of these strikes
lasted for less than one day and the average was six days.
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that there have been so few strikes considering the lack of recognized procedures for settling labor controversies. Most government unions, affiliated or not, have as a matter of policy adopted a
no strike provision. The public is inclined to take its civil servants
for granted until there is an interruption of the usual services,
and then the concern is the restoration of the services rather than
attempting to correct the working conditions of the public employees.
It was not until the close of World War II with its consequent
labor unrest resulting in a number of strikes that anti-strike legislation was passed. The Taft-Hartley Act, passed in 1947,20 specifically prohibits public employee strikes:
It shall be unlawful for any individual employed by
the United States or any agency thereof including wholly
owned Government Corporations to participate in any
strike. Any individual, employed by the United States
or by any such agency, who strikes, shall be discharged
immediately from his employment, and shall forfeit his
civil service status, if any, and shall not be eligible for reemployment for 3 years by the United States or any such
agency.
There have been no strikes since the passage of this Act and the
validity of this legislation has not been questioned.
About one fourth of the states have passed similar legislation. 21 The Michigan statute is typical and pertinent portions read
as follows:
An Act to prohibit strikes by certain public employees; to provide certain disciplinary action with respect thereto; to provide for the mediation of grievances
and to prescribe penalties for the violations of the provisions of this Act . ..No person holding a position by
appointment or employment in the government of any one
or more of the political subdivisions thereof, or in the
public school service, or in any public or special district,
or in the service of any authority, commission, or board,
or in any other branch of the public service, hereinafter
called a 'public employee', shall strike.
The Act further provides for loss of position, rights and pension
unless reappointed. Reappointment, employment, or re-employIOLabor-Managemeht Relations Act, 29 U. S. C, A., P. L. 101-80th Cong.,
Sec. 305.
21 Indiana Acts
1947, c. 341 (public utilities only); Michigan, Public Acts
1947, No. 336, p. 524; Minnesota, Laws 1947, c. 335 (charitable hospitals); Missouri, Revised Statutes Annotated, 1947, Sec. 10178.207; Nebraska, Laws 1947,
c. 178; New Jersey, Acts 1947, Senate 323 (public utilities only); New York,
Gen. Laws 1947, c. 391; Ohio, Code Supp. 1947, Sec. 17-7; Pennsylvania, Laws
1947, p. 1161; Texas, Laws 1947, c. 135; Virginia, Laws 1946, c. 333; Washington,
Laws 1947, c. 287.
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ment are conditioned on not receiving any more salary than was
received at the time of the violation. No salary increase can be
granted for one year and the employee is on probation for two
years. The constitutionality of the Act was tested in Detroit v. Division 26 of Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway
and Motor Coach Employees of America. The court held that the
right of public employees to collectively refuse to render the services for which they are employed differs in legal point of view from
the right of private employees to strike and that the classification
of public employees for purpose of applicable legislation was valid.
The court recognized that the operation of a transit system was
a proprietary activity of government but held that this
constituted
2
engaging in a public enterprise for a public purpose. Experts advocate differing opinions on the right of public
employees to strike.2 3 Some adopt the view that government is
different and that no one has the right to strike against the government at anytime under any circumstances even though this
is not the view they express with regard to employees in private
industry. A number of reasons have been advanced in support of
their conclusions: the state is sovereign and cannot tolerate defiance on the part of its employees; the state represents all of the
people and all groups and cannot yield to the pressure of one
group; conditions of employment in the public service are fixed
by law, unilaterally, and cannot be made the subject of bargaining
and bilateral agreements as in a treaty between sovereign powers;
the principal employment decisions are made by legislative bodies,
not by executives, and consequently a strike is directed against
the ultimate representative assemblies, which by definition cannot
and in the general interest ought not to have their free decision
foreclosed by force. These sentiments were echoed by a New York
court in the following language :24
To tolerate or recognize any combination of Civil
Service employees of the Government as a labor organization or union is not only incompatible with the spirit
of democracy, but inconsistent with every principle upon
which our Government is founded. Nothing is more dangerous to public welfare than to admit that hired servants
of the state can dictate to the Government the hours, the
wages and conditions under which they will carry on essential services vital to the welfare, safety and security
of the citizen. To admit as true that Government employees have power to halt or check the functions of Government, unless their demands are satisfied, is to transfer
to them all legislative, executive and judicial power.
Nothing would be more ridiculous.
The reasons are obvious which forbid acceptance of
12

332 Mich. 237, 51 N. W. (2d) 228 (1952).
Strikes in the Public Service. 10 PERSON NEL REVIEW (January, 1949).

" Railway Mail Ass'n v. Murphy, 180 Misc. 868, 44 N. Y. S. (2d)

601 (1943).
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any such doctrine. Government is formed for the benefit
of all persons, and the duty of all to support it is equally
clear. Nothing is more certain than the indispensable
necessity of Government, and it is equally true, that unless the people surrender some of their natural rights to
the Government, it cannot operate. Much as we all recognize the value and the necessity of collective bargaining
in industrial and social life, nonetheless, such bargaining is impossible between the Government and its employees, by reason of the very nature of Government itself. The formidable and familiar weapon in industrial
strife and warfare-the strike-is without justification
when used against the Government. When so used, it is
rebellion against constituted authority.
Another view that is often expressed is that strikes in the
public service are to be avoided, but circumstances may exist and
occasionally do in which a strike is defensible in the public interest
itself and unavoidable in the interest of employees. The belief is
that the right to strike as a means of securing improvement in
conditions of employment is one of the fundamental elements of
liberty in the American sense of the term and has been an incentive in private industry for better management. Government
employees abhor violence and would resort to the strike as a last
resort. Strikes are tolerated in private industry, and yet when
the government is engaged in the same type of activity, the strike
becomes illegal. Justice Buford in a vigorous dissent put it this

way :25
in the operation of its waterworks system, the city acts
in its proprietary or corporate capacity and not in its
sovereign governmental capacity; that in the performance of such activity the city is bound by the same laws
and burdened with the same duties toward its employees
in that activity as may be applicable to any persons or
corporation engaged in like activity.
Strikes in the public service are not necessarily more serious than
those in which private employees are engaged. Certainly a strike
on the nation's railroads, coal mines, or milk industry is more
serious than a strike of file clerks, street sweepers, welfare employees or golf course employees.
The true test should depend on the nature and gravity of the
consequences involved in a strike, whether by the government, a
government corporation, mixed enterprise or a private enterprise
affected with the public interest. A rule that "a strike that would
bring direct, immediate, certain, and serious danger to a primary
interest of the community should be prohibited by law, with adequate sanctions, but also with adequate means to secure full public consideration and solution of the issues involved" would be a
I Miami Local No. 654 v. Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. (2d)

194 (1946).
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good rule. Certainly the past decisions of some courts would still
be good law under this rule. This is illustrated by the enjoining
of strikes in two hospitals on the grounds that such
2 6 strikes were
contrary to the best interests of the general public.
Both statutory law and judicial decisions discriminate arbitrarily against a large group of Americans by excluding them from
labor legislation and enacting statutes limiting their rights and
privileges. It is clear that there should be an extension of the
definition of public interest to include employees of private industry where cessation of work results in great harm to the public
interest. Strikes should be banned when the public interest is
harmed whether the strike be by private or public employees. It
is important that public employees have the right to strike when
the public interest is not harmed and when the government is engaged in proprietary and not sovereign activities.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
TORTS - INTERPRETATION AND OPERATION OF COLORADO'S GUEST STATUTE CLARIFIED IN SEVERAL RECENT CASES-The latest, and perhaps the most important, of
the recent guest statute cases is PettingelU v. Moede. 1 In this case
the plaintiff's injury resulted from an automobile accident which
occurred when the defendant driver, who was inexperienced in
mountain driving, applied his brakes and' slid off of an icy highway on a mountain pass. He had been warned to put on chains,
but had not done so as there were "winter" tires on the jeep that
he was driving. The plaintiff, who was a guest and the only passenger, had made no protest on the defendant's driving. There
were only minor variations in the testimony, and the case was
submitted to a jury which returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The
defendant appealed from the judgment entered on this verdict, and
the Supreme Court reversed with directions to dismiss the action.
The Court states that recent presentations made to it have
revealed that there is still a good deal of uncertainty and confusion
as to the provisions of our guest statute.2 The statute specifies
three instances where the driver of a vehicle may be liable to his
guest. Neither intentional accident nor intoxication are here involved, so if there is a liability, it has to be on "negligence consisting of a wilful and wanton disregard of the rights of others."
Admitting that it has previously been said that this phrase is selfevident,3 the Court undertakes to clarify the interpretation of it.
Society of N. Y. Hospital v. Hanson, 59 N. Y. S. (2d)
Hospital of Brooklyn v. Doe, 252 App. Div. 581.
IColo. -,
1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 15, p. 358.
2'35 C. S. A., c. 16, §371.

'Foster v. Redding, 97 Colo. 4, 45 P. (2d) 940 (1935).

91 (1945); Jewish

